Draft in the CWE catalog · 10 CVEs mapped
The product uses a protection mechanism whose strength depends heavily on its obscurity, such that knowledge of its algorithms or key data is sufficient to defeat the mechanism.
An insufficient encryption vulnerability exists in the Device Authentication functionality of GeoVision GV-IP Device Utility 9.0.5. Listening to broadcast packets can lead to credentials leak. An attacker can listen to broadcast messages to trigger this vulnerability. When interacting with various Geovision devices on the network, the utility may send privileged commands; in order to do so, the username and password of the device need to be provided. In some instances the command is broadcasted over UDP and the username/password are encrypted using a cryptographic protocol that appears to be derivated from Blowfish. However the symmetric key used for the encryption is also included in the packet, and thus the security of the username/password only relies on the "obscurity" of the encryption scheme. An attacker on the same LAN can listen to the broadcast traffic once an admin user interacts with the device, and decrypt the credentials using their own implementation of the algorithm. With this password the attacker would have full control over the device configuration, allowing them to change its ip address or even reset it to factory default.
An insufficient encryption vulnerability exists in the Device Authentication functionality of GeoVision GV-IP Device Utility 9.0.5. Listening to broadcast packets can lead to credentials leak. An attacker can listen to broadcast messages to trigger this vulnerability. When interacting with various Geovision devices on the network, the utility may send privileged commands; in order to do so, the username and password of the device need to be provided. In some instances the command is broadcasted over UDP and the username/password are encrypted using a cryptographic protocol that appears to be derivated from Blowfish. However the symmetric key used for the encryption is also included in the packet, and thus the security of the username/password only relies on the "obscurity" of the encryption scheme. An attacker on the same LAN can listen to the broadcast traffic once an admin user interacts with the device, and decrypt the credentials using their own implementation of the algorithm. With this password the attacker would have full control over the device configuration, allowing them to change its ip address or even reset it to factory default.
Exos 9300 instances are using a randomly generated database password to connect to the configured MSSQL server. The password is derived from static random values, which are concatenated to the hostname and a random string that can be read by every user from the registry. This allows an attacker to derive the database password and get authenticated access to the central exos 9300 database as the user Exos9300Common. The user has the roles ExosDialog and ExosDialogDotNet assigned, which are able to read most tables of the database as well as update and insert into many tables.