Draft in the CWE catalog · 948 CVEs mapped
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.
Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers. The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login. The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation. Version affected: ≤2.5.45
wger before 2.6 (affected versions <= 2.5.0) contains an open redirect vulnerability in the trainer_login view (wger/core/views/user.py). After a trainer enters impersonation mode, the view redirects to the user-supplied 'next' GET parameter via HttpResponseRedirect() without validating it with url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(). An attacker who delivers a crafted link to an authenticated trainer can redirect the trainer's browser to an attacker-controlled domain, enabling phishing and leaking the wger URL structure (including the impersonated user's user_pk) via the Referer header.
h3 versions before 2.0.1-rc.18 contain an open redirect vulnerability in the redirectBack() utility that fails to sanitize protocol-relative paths in the Referer header pathname. Attackers can craft a same-origin URL with a double-slash path segment that passes origin validation but produces a Location header interpreted by browsers as a protocol-relative redirect to an external domain.