Draft in the CWE catalog · 47 CVEs mapped
The product, when processing trusted data, accepts any untrusted data that is also included with the trusted data, treating the untrusted data as if it were trusted.
Nuxt OG Image generates OG Images with Vue templates in Nuxt. From 6.2.5 until 6.7.0, the dynamic /_og/d/*.png route accepts unsigned requests while resolvePathCacheKey() produces cache keys from the request path, site URL, and normalized rendering options exposed through image URLs and server responses. An unauthenticated attacker can provide attacker-controlled image data through the title parameter together with a derived cacheKey and populate the cache slot used for a legitimate Open Graph image, causing spoofed image content to be served to users. This issue is fixed in version 6.7.0.
GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 16.2 before 19.2.8, 19.3 before 19.3.5, and 19.4 before 19.4.2 that, under certain deployment configurations, could have allowed an authenticated user to poison cached page content served to other users due to improper cache key construction.
Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: "To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, "other nodes can submit the block proof instead." In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.