Incomplete in the CWE catalog · 256 CVEs mapped
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor.
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.7.0, an unauthenticated user with access to encrypted credential data from an affected Splunk SOAR instance could submit Basic authentication data to the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to expose and decrypt that encrypted credential data. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR decrypts encrypted Basic authentication values before completing authentication checks. The attack requires the unauthenticated user to have encrypted credential data from an affected Splunk SOAR instance. The unauthenticated user should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will. For more information see Using the REST API reference for Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/rest-api-reference/8.5.0/using-the-splunk-soar-rest-api/using-the-rest-api-reference-for-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation.
The authentication endpoint of WSO2 Identity Server fails to provide a consistent system response when a username does not exist in the system, allowing attackers to differentiate between valid and invalid usernames. This difference in responses can be leveraged to enumerate existing user accounts. Successful exploitation enables an attacker to discover valid usernames within the system, significantly increasing the risk of subsequent attacks such as brute force attacks on user credentials, social engineering attacks, and information leakage. The discovered usernames can be used to craft targeted phishing emails or other social engineering campaigns.
Coder before 2.29.17, 2.30.0 before 2.32.7, 2.33.0 before 2.33.8, and 2.34.0 before 2.34.2 contains a user enumeration vulnerability because userpassword.Compare() substitutes a placeholder hash derived from the string "hunter2" when a stored password hash is empty. Unauthenticated attackers can submit logins with the password "hunter2" and distinguish HTTP 403 from 401 responses to enumerate valid accounts and reveal the authentication provider of SSO-only users.