Incomplete in the CWE catalog · 10 CVEs mapped
The product is built from multiple separate components, but it uses a component that is not sufficiently trusted to meet expectations for security, reliability, updateability, and maintainability.
The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.
A flaw was found in quay-builder-qemu. A remote attacker could exploit this by compromising the upstream `Noelware/docker-manifest-action` used in the release workflow, which is pinned to a mutable branch. This allows the attacker to inject arbitrary code, leading to the exfiltration of sensitive registry credentials or the publication of malicious images. The workflow also exposes the default GitHub token, increasing the severity of the compromise.
Dell PowerProtect One, versions 20.1.0.0 and below, contain a Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Cache poisoning.