CVE-2026-98260

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()

A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is

attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread's

posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.

When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns

that PID. pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,

but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()

takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it

has nothing to undo.

begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after

exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state

normally stays invisible. But bprm->point_of_no_return is set before

de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or

exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.

exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,

and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.

In short:

the non-leader thread B the parent

timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)

timer_settime()

arm_timer() // the node is queued on B

execve()

de_thread(B)

exchange_tids(B, leader) // B's PID now belongs to the leader

release_task(leader)

__exit_signal(leader)

posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader) // cleans leader's queue, not B's

__unhash_process(leader) // that PID has no task anymore

exec_mmap()

mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm)

kill(B, SIGKILL)

// -EINTR

get_signal()

do_exit()

exit_itimers()

posix_timer_delete()

posix_cpu_timer_del()

posix_timer_unhash_and_free() // freed while still queued

wait4()

release_task(B)

posix_cpu_timers_exit(B)

cleanup_timerqueue()

timerqueue_del() // use-after-free

Move the POSIX timer cleanup right after de_thread() before any of the

later failure conditions brings the task into do_exit().

[ tglx: Move the cleanup right after de_thread() ]