Medium · published September 24, 2026
SigNoz versions from v0.98.0 up to (but not including) v0.143.0, when configured to use the opaque session tokenizer (which was not the default before v0.143.0), do not revoke a user's existing login sessions when the user's password is reset with a reset token (UpdatePasswordByResetPasswordToken, reachable via POST /api/v2/factor_password/reset) or when the user is deleted (DeleteUser, reachable via DELETE /api/v2/users/{id}). Neither code path calls the tokenizer's DeleteTokensByUserID, so cached tokens and identities are left in place. An attacker who already holds a session token for the account — for example from a stolen browser session or from a user being offboarded — retains the account's full access, up to administrator, after a password reset until the token reaches its configured maximum lifetime (30 days by default), and after user deletion until the token next rotates (30 minutes by default). This defeats password reset and user deletion as a means of terminating access. The issue is fixed in v0.143.0.