CVE-2026-90015

CVE-2026-90015

published September 16, 2026

CVSS
—
EPSS
0%
Percentile
10.7
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments

When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the

endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail

through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.

xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,

copies the data back into the URB's buffer.

The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg,

under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.

That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more

segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.

Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce

buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.

The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length

and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize

sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous

contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.

Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was

found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity

target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather

than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so

wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash

block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them

into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each.

At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every

segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to

wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and

dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted:

device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted

A reproducer running this under qemu is available at

https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity

The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs)

already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track.

Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on

completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping

every segment that still has a pending bounce.

Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce

implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is

always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started

in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign

bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk

correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg.

[mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.]

The record
Technical detail
CVSS
Not scored
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00210 · 10.7th percentile
Published
2026-09-16T15:17Z
References (8)
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 18 SEP 04:02Z
    EPSS moved — → 0%
    epss
  • 16 SEP 10:33Z
    xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments
    cvelistv5