CVE-2026-89490

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix readdir position truncation on 32-bit kernels

In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is

rebuilt with

ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

`ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is

unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask

~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)

is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB

block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that

unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic

conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of

`ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is

allowed to exceed 4 GiB.

When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the

position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the

re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely.

This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken

for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross

4 GiB reaches it.

This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix

bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the

fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand

to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND:

ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

64-bit kernels are unaffected.