Critical · published July 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
| Product | Versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| linux/linux_kernel | ≥ 6.0, < 6.6.145 | 6.6.145 |
| linux/linux_kernel | ≥ 6.7, < 6.12.96 | 6.12.96 |
| linux/linux_kernel | ≥ 6.13, < 6.18.39 | 6.18.39 |
| linux/linux_kernel | ≥ 6.19, < 7.1.4 | 7.1.4 |