CVE-2026-64289

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len

iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,

each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size

makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess

in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory

trips the soft-lockup watchdog.

A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop

with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and

flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.

Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request

struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation

queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.