CVE-2026-63962

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()

svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once

before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every

point in the loop.

In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of

at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX

modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the

CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming

ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set,

an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken

or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to

ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra

Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,

the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For

mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the

partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen

SVID/VDO bytes.

Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed

past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner

supplies or how the function was reached.