CVE-2026-63075

Issue summary: When OpenSSL processes QUIC traffic from a peer that repeatedly

sends ack-eliciting packets while not acknowledging ACK-only responses, the

QUIC stack can retain ACK-only packet metadata for the lifetime of the

connection.

Impact summary: A remote peer that can complete a QUIC handshake can

cause connection-scoped memory growth which may lead to Denial of Service

through memory exhaustion, especially with sustained traffic or many concurrent

QUIC connections.

CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Description: When the OpenSSL QUIC stack sends an ACK-only packet,

there is no requirement by the QUIC protocol that the peer will acknowledge

that ACK-only packet (i.e. it is itself not ack-eliciting). However, the OpenSSL

implementation stores the metadata about the ACK frames regardless.

In and of itself that's ok, but if a malicious peer establishes a connection, and

then drives the connection such that ACK-only packets are forced from the

OpenSSL implementation peer (i.e., by sending numerous PING frames),

and then withholding any subsequent acks for ack-eliciting data, like

legitimate data, said malicious peer can force inappropriate memory growth

on the OpenSSL peer, potentially leading to a Denial of Service.

The fix is to ensure that we account for the transmission of the ACK-only

packet in the packet histories high and low watermark without actually storing

the ACK-only packet metadata itself.

FIPS impact: no

The OpenSSL FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC code is

outside the FIPS module boundary.