CVE-2026-52951

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe/dma-buf: handle empty bo and UAF races

There look to be some nasty races here when triggering the

invalidate_mappings hook:

1) We do xe_bo_alloc() followed by the attach, before the actual full bo

init step in xe_dma_buf_init_obj(). However the bo is visible on the

attachments list after the attach. This is bad since exporter driver,

say amdgpu, can at any time call back into our invalidate_mappings hook,

with an empty/bogus bo, leading to potential bugs/crashes.

2) Similar to 1) but here we get a UAF, when the invalidate_mappings

hook is triggered. For example, we get as far as xe_bo_init_locked()

but this fails in some way. But here the bo will be freed on error, but

we still have it attached from dma-buf pov, so if the

invalidate_mappings is now triggered then the bo we access is gone and

we trigger UAF and more bugs/crashes.

To fix this, move the attach step until after we actually have a fully

set up buffer object. Note that the bo is not published to userspace

until later, so not sure what the comment "Don't publish the bo

until we have a valid attachment", is referring to.

We have at least two different customers reporting hitting a NULL ptr

deref in evict_flags when importing something from amdgpu, followed by

triggering the evict flow. Hit rate is also pretty low, which would

hint at some kind of race, so something like 1) or 2) might explain

this.

v2:

- Shuffle the order of the ops slightly (no functional change)

- Improve the comment to better explain the ordering (Matt B)

(cherry picked from commit af1f2ad0c59fe4e2f924c526f66e968289d77971)