CVE-2026-46064

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()

The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to

compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from

user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8,

data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size.

A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing

memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into

adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor

over MMIO.

Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields

claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose

own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause

the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning

failure.

Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking

an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware

frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a

corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.

Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the

memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame,

consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size()

for the header field.