CVE-2026-45550CWE-639CWE-862CWE-863

Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body

Critical · published June 10, 2026

CVSS v3.1
9.1
EPSS
0%
Percentile
26.4
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

The record
Technical detail
CVSS v3.1
9.1 · CRITICAL
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00341 · 26.4th percentile
Weaknesses
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key; CWE-862 · Missing Authorization; CWE-863 · Incorrect Authorization
Published
2026-06-10T14:00Z
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 10 JUN 14:00Z
    Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body
    cvelistv5