Medium · published August 7, 2026
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.
An active Datadog session cached locally.
Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.