usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size

in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block

size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether

this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the

`common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During

initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction

between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command

requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the

left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data

size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory

corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the

shift and catch any overflows.