apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it

AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after

removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode

can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of

the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has

been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and

accessing it through the fs.

While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the

race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be

possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.

Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct

place which is during inode eviction.