CVE-2026-17534CWE-918

Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects

Medium · published July 27, 2026

CVSS v3.1
5.5
EPSS
0%
Percentile
4.6
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.

The record
Technical detail
CVSS v3.1
5.5 · MEDIUM
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00158 · 4.6th percentile
Weakness
CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Published
2026-07-27T09:19Z
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 27 JUL 09:19Z
    Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects
    cvelistv5