High · published September 14, 2026
The MQTT-SN client keepalive handler process_ping() in subsys/net/lib/mqtt_sn/mqtt_sn.c removes the gateway record after PINGREQ retries are exhausted. It invoked SYS_SLIST_PEEK_HEAD_CONTAINER(&client->gateways, gw, next) but discarded the result. That macro is a pure expression that does not assign to gw, so gw retained its NULL initializer regardless of the list contents.
The code then dereferences the NULL gw (gw->gw_id) and passes it to mqtt_sn_gw_destroy(), reaching k_mem_slab_free(&gateways, NULL). With CONFIG_MEM_SLAB_POINTER_VALIDATE enabled this triggers k_panic(); in the default configuration it performs a write through the NULL pointer ((char )mem = slab->free_list;) and corrupts the slab free list. The outcome is a crash/kernel panic or, on targets where address 0 is writable, silent memory-allocator corruption.
The vulnerable branch runs whenever the connected MQTT-SN gateway fails to answer keepalive PINGREQs for the configured number of retries. This condition is controlled by the remote peer: a malicious or compromised gateway, or an on-path/adjacent attacker that advertises itself as a gateway and then stops responding (or blackholes the real gateway's PINGRESPs), forces the client into the defect. MQTT-SN runs over UDP and no authentication is required.
The impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service (availability) of the affected MQTT-SN client; there is no attacker-controlled data written. The sibling remover process_advertise() uses SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE and is not affected. The fix assigns the macro's return value to gw.