CVE-2025-39961

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level

The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels

(up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on

IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level

to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.

The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its

exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based

on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU

driver increases page table level.

But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads

pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case,

when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte()

reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with

level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is

iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.

CPU 0 CPU 1

------ ------

map pages unmap pages

alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte()

pgtable->root = pte (new root value)

READ pgtable->[mode/root]

Reads new root, old mode

Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1)

Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a

spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path.