CVE-2024-56633

tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg

published December 27, 2024

CVSS
—
EPSS
0%
Percentile
19.6
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg

The current sk memory accounting logic in __SK_REDIRECT is pre-uncharging

tosend bytes, which is either msg->sg.size or a smaller value apply_bytes.

Potential problems with this strategy are as follows:

- If the actual sent bytes are smaller than tosend, we need to charge some

bytes back, as in line 487, which is okay but seems not clean.

- When tosend is set to apply_bytes, as in line 417, and (ret < 0), we may

miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes.

[...]

415 tosend = msg->sg.size;

416 if (psock->apply_bytes && psock->apply_bytes < tosend)

417 tosend = psock->apply_bytes;

[...]

443 sk_msg_return(sk, msg, tosend);

444 release_sock(sk);

446 origsize = msg->sg.size;

447 ret = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress,

448 msg, tosend, flags);

449 sent = origsize - msg->sg.size;

[...]

454 lock_sock(sk);

455 if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {

456 int free = sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, msg);

458 if (!cork)

459 *copied -= free;

460 }

[...]

487 if (eval == __SK_REDIRECT)

488 sk_mem_charge(sk, tosend - sent);

[...]

When running the selftest test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem with txmsg_apply,

the following warning will be reported:

------------[ cut here ]------------

WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 57 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0

Modules linked in:

CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 57 Comm: kworker/6:0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1.bm.1-amd64+ #43

Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014

Workqueue: events sk_psock_destroy

RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0

RSP: 0018:ffffad0a8021fe08 EFLAGS: 00010206

RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: ffff9aab4475b900 RCX: ffff9aab481a0800

RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: ffff9aab4475b900

RBP: ffff9aab4475b990 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aab40050ec0

R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9aae6fdb1d01 R12: ffff9aab49c60400

R13: ffff9aab49c60598 R14: ffff9aab49c60598 R15: dead000000000100

FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aae6fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000

CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033

CR2: 00007ffec7e47bd8 CR3: 00000001a1a1c004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0

DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000

DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

PKRU: 55555554

Call Trace:

<TASK>

? __warn+0x89/0x130

? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0

? report_bug+0xfc/0x1e0

? handle_bug+0x5c/0xa0

? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70

? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20

? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0

__sk_destruct+0x25/0x220

sk_psock_destroy+0x2b2/0x310

process_scheduled_works+0xa3/0x3e0

worker_thread+0x117/0x240

? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10

kthread+0xcf/0x100

? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10

ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40

? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10

ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

</TASK>

---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In __SK_REDIRECT, a more concise way is delaying the uncharging after sent

bytes are finalized, and uncharge this value. When (ret < 0), we shall

invoke sk_msg_free.

Same thing happens in case __SK_DROP, when tosend is set to apply_bytes,

we may miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes. The same

warning will be reported in selftest.

[...]

468 case __SK_DROP:

469 default:

470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend);

471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend);

472 *copied -= (tosend + delta);

473 return -EACCES;

[...]

So instead of sk_msg_free_partial we can do sk_msg_free here.

The record
Technical detail
CVSS
Not scored
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00281 · 19.6th percentile
Published
2024-12-27T15:02Z
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 27 DEC 15:02Z
    tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg
    cvelistv5