CVE-2024-53680

ipvs: fix UB due to uninitialized stack access in ip_vs_protocol_init()

published January 11, 2025

CVSS
—
EPSS
0%
Percentile
12.9
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvs: fix UB due to uninitialized stack access in ip_vs_protocol_init()

Under certain kernel configurations when building with Clang/LLVM, the

compiler does not generate a return or jump as the terminator

instruction for ip_vs_protocol_init(), triggering the following objtool

warning during build time:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ip_vs_protocol_init() falls through to next function __initstub__kmod_ip_vs_rr__935_123_ip_vs_rr_init6()

At runtime, this either causes an oops when trying to load the ipvs

module or a boot-time panic if ipvs is built-in. This same issue has

been reported by the Intel kernel test robot previously.

Digging deeper into both LLVM and the kernel code reveals this to be a

undefined behavior problem. ip_vs_protocol_init() uses a on-stack buffer

of 64 chars to store the registered protocol names and leaves it

uninitialized after definition. The function calls strnlen() when

concatenating protocol names into the buffer. With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE

strnlen() performs an extra step to check whether the last byte of the

input char buffer is a null character (commit 3009f891bb9f ("fortify:

Allow strlen() and strnlen() to pass compile-time known lengths")).

This, together with possibly other configurations, cause the following

IR to be generated:

define hidden i32 @ip_vs_protocol_init() local_unnamed_addr #5 section ".init.text" align 16 !kcfi_type !29 {

%1 = alloca [64 x i8], align 16

...

14: ; preds = %11

%15 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63

%16 = load i8, ptr %15, align 1

%17 = tail call i1 @llvm.is.constant.i8(i8 %16)

%18 = icmp eq i8 %16, 0

%19 = select i1 %17, i1 %18, i1 false

br i1 %19, label %20, label %23

20: ; preds = %14

%21 = call i64 @strlen(ptr noundef nonnull dereferenceable(1) %1) #23

...

23: ; preds = %14, %11, %20

%24 = call i64 @strnlen(ptr noundef nonnull dereferenceable(1) %1, i64 noundef 64) #24

...

}

The above code calculates the address of the last char in the buffer

(value %15) and then loads from it (value %16). Because the buffer is

never initialized, the LLVM GVN pass marks value %16 as undefined:

%13 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63

br i1 undef, label %14, label %17

This gives later passes (SCCP, in particular) more DCE opportunities by

propagating the undef value further, and eventually removes everything

after the load on the uninitialized stack location:

define hidden i32 @ip_vs_protocol_init() local_unnamed_addr #0 section ".init.text" align 16 !kcfi_type !11 {

%1 = alloca [64 x i8], align 16

...

12: ; preds = %11

%13 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63

unreachable

}

In this way, the generated native code will just fall through to the

next function, as LLVM does not generate any code for the unreachable IR

instruction and leaves the function without a terminator.

Zero the on-stack buffer to avoid this possible UB.

The record
Technical detail
CVSS
Not scored
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00229 · 12.9th percentile
Published
2025-01-11T12:25Z
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 11 JAN 12:25Z
    ipvs: fix UB due to uninitialized stack access in ip_vs_protocol_init()
    cvelistv5