vfio/type1: fix cap_migration information leak

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vfio/type1: fix cap_migration information leak

Fix an information leak where an uninitialized hole in struct

vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration on the stack is exposed to userspace.

The definition of struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration contains a hole as

shown in this pahole(1) output:

struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration {

struct vfio_info_cap_header header; /* 0 8 */

__u32 flags; /* 8 4 */

/* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */

__u64 pgsize_bitmap; /* 16 8 */

__u64 max_dirty_bitmap_size; /* 24 8 */

/* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 4 */

/* sum members: 28, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */

/* last cacheline: 32 bytes */

};

The cap_mig variable is filled in without initializing the hole:

static int vfio_iommu_migration_build_caps(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,

struct vfio_info_cap *caps)

{

struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration cap_mig;

cap_mig.header.id = VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1_INFO_CAP_MIGRATION;

cap_mig.header.version = 1;

cap_mig.flags = 0;

/* support minimum pgsize */

cap_mig.pgsize_bitmap = (size_t)1 << __ffs(iommu->pgsize_bitmap);

cap_mig.max_dirty_bitmap_size = DIRTY_BITMAP_SIZE_MAX;

return vfio_info_add_capability(caps, &cap_mig.header, sizeof(cap_mig));

}

The structure is then copied to a temporary location on the heap. At this point

it's already too late and ioctl(VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO) copies it to userspace

later:

int vfio_info_add_capability(struct vfio_info_cap *caps,

struct vfio_info_cap_header *cap, size_t size)

{

struct vfio_info_cap_header *header;

header = vfio_info_cap_add(caps, size, cap->id, cap->version);

if (IS_ERR(header))

return PTR_ERR(header);

memcpy(header + 1, cap + 1, size - sizeof(*header));

return 0;

}

This issue was found by code inspection.