CVE-2022-49236

bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module

High · published February 26, 2025

CVSS v3.1
7.8
EPSS
0%
Percentile
18.9
In the wild
Unconfirmed
What it is

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module

While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from

its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the

module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The

existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if

mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference

when module initcall is happening in parallel.

Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier

callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked.

The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an

ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules

list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF.

However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e.

its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail

and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing

stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition

from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE.

This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads

successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call

fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put

for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't

regress in this area in future.

There are multiple points after prepare_coming_module (in load_module)

where failure can occur and module loading can return error. We

illustrate and test for the race using the last point where it can

practically occur (in module __init function).

An illustration of the race:

CPU 0 CPU 1

load_module

notifier_call(MODULE_STATE_COMING)

btf_parse_module

btf_alloc_id // Published to userspace

list_add(&btf_mod->list, btf_modules)

mod->init(...)

... ^

bpf_check |

check_pseudo_btf_id |

btf_try_get_module |

returns true | ...

... | module __init in progress

return prog_fd | ...

... V

if (ret < 0)

free_module(mod)

...

close(prog_fd)

...

bpf_prog_free_deferred

module_put(used_btf.mod) // use-after-free

We fix this issue by setting a flag BTF_MODULE_F_LIVE, from the notifier

callback when MODULE_STATE_LIVE state is reached for the module, so that

we return NULL from btf_try_get_module for modules that are not fully

formed. Since try_module_get already checks that module is not in

MODULE_STATE_GOING state, and that is the only transition a live module

can make before being removed from btf_modules list, this is enough to

close the race and prevent the bug.

A later selftest patch crafts the race condition artifically to verify

that it has been fixed, and that verifier fails to load program (with

ENXIO).

Lastly, a couple of comments:

1. Even if this race didn't exist, it seems more appropriate to only

access resources (ksyms and kfuncs) of a fully formed module which

has been initialized completely.

2. This patch was born out of need for synchronization against module

initcall for the next patch, so it is needed for correctness even

without the aforementioned race condition. The BTF resources

initialized by module initcall are set up once and then only looked

up, so just waiting until the initcall has finished ensures correct

behavior.

The record
Technical detail
CVSS v3.1
7.8 · HIGH
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v4.0
Not supplied
EPSS
0.00275 · 18.9th percentile
Published
2025-02-26T01:56Z
EPSS history
Timeline
  • 26 FEB 01:56Z
    bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module
    cvelistv5